Publications
Selected publications
- SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY (Journal article - 2020)
- The genealogical method in epistemology (Journal article - 2020)
- Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning (Journal article - 2020)
- Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy (Chapter - 2021)
- Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief (Journal article - 2019)
- Non-Ideal Epistemology (Book - 2023)
2024
What is good thinking? Comments on Mona Simion’s <i>Shifty Speech and Independent Thought</i>
McKenna, R. (2024). What is good thinking? Comments on Mona Simion’s <i>Shifty Speech and Independent Thought</i>. Inquiry, 1-13. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2024.2313188
The duty to listen
Joshi, H., & McKenna, R. (n.d.). The duty to listen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi:10.1111/phpr.13119
2023
Non-Ideal Epistemology
McKenna, R. (2023). Non-Ideal Epistemology. Oxford University PressOxford. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192888822.001.0001
Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science
Kidd, I. J., & McKenna, R. (Eds.) (n.d.). Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science (Vol. na). Springer Nature.
Virtues and Vices in a Non-Ideal World
McKenna, R. (2023). Virtues and Vices in a Non-Ideal World. Retrieved from https://blog.oup.com/2023/09/virtues-and-vices-in-a-non-ideal-world/
2022
The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology
McKenna, R. (2022). The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology. PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 72(4), 1048-1051. doi:10.1093/pq/pqac002
Bortolotti on Epistemic Innocence
McKenna, R. (2022). Bortolotti on Epistemic Innocence. ANALYSIS, 82(2), 367-376. doi:10.1093/analys/anac015
Review of Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology by Endre Begby
McKenna, R. (2022). Review of Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology by Endre Begby. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology
McKenna, R. (2022). Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF SKEPTICISM, 12(2), 188-192. doi:10.1163/22105700-BJA10034
Is knowledge a social phenomenon?
McKenna, R. (2022). Is knowledge a social phenomenon?. INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2022.2135823
2021
Assertion, action, and context
McKenna, R., & Hannon, M. (2021). Assertion, action, and context. SYNTHESE, 199(1-2), 731-743. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02705-0
Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology
Carter, J. A., & McKenna, R. (2021). Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology. ERKENNTNIS, 86(5), 1139-1159. doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w
Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy
McKenna, R. (2021). Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy. In Epistemic Autonomy (pp. 113-131). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003003465-9
A (Partial) Defense of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism
McKenna, R. (2021). A (Partial) Defense of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism. In SKEPTICAL INVARIANTISM RECONSIDERED (pp. 154-171). Retrieved from https://www.webofscience.com/
Asymmetrical irrationality
McKenna, R. (2021). Asymmetrical irrationality. In The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology (pp. 285-295). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780429326769-34
Mill and Ideal Theory
McKenna, R. (2021). Mill and Ideal Theory. Retrieved from https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/openfordebate/mill-and-ideal-theory/
2020
Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning
McKenna, R., & Carter, J. A. (2020). Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(6), 702-718. doi:10.1017/can.2020.16
Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism
Mckenna, R. J. (2020). Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism. In G. Axtell, & A. Bernal (Eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Rowman & Littlefield. Retrieved from https://rowman.com/
Feminist Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment
McKenna, R. (2020). Feminist Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment. In Social Epistemology and Relativism (pp. 103-121). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780429199356-9
Introduction
Ashton, N. A., Kusch, M., McKenna, R., & Sodoma, K. A. (2020). Introduction. In Unknown Book (pp. 1-7).
Social Epistemology and Relativism
Ashton, N. A., Kusch, M., McKenna, R., & Sodoma, K. A. (Eds.) (n.d.). Social Epistemology and Relativism. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780429199356
The Disappearance of Ignorance
McKenna, R. (2019). The Disappearance of Ignorance. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 1-17. doi:10.1163/22105700-20191371
SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY
Ashton, N. A., & McKenna, R. (2020). SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY. Episteme, 17(1), 28-47. doi:10.1017/epi.2018.11
The genealogical method in epistemology
Kusch, M., & McKenna, R. (2020). The genealogical method in epistemology. Synthese, 197(3), 1057-1076. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1675-1
2019
Climate change: three ways to market the science to reach the sceptics
McKenna, R. (2019). Climate change: three ways to market the science to reach the sceptics. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/
Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge
Carter, J. A., & McKenna, R. (2019). Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. SYNTHESE, 196(12), 4989-5007. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8
Vices of the mind: From the intellectual to the political
McKenna, R. (2019). Vices of the mind: From the intellectual to the political. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 27(4), 1084-1087. doi:10.1111/ejop.12504
Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief
McKenna, R. (2019). Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 36(5). doi:10.1111/japp.12347
Extended Epistemology
Mckenna, R. (2019). Extended Epistemology. ANALYSIS, 79(4), 790-799. doi:10.1093/analys/anz074
Relativism and Externalism
Mckenna, R. J., & Carter, J. A. (n.d.). Relativism and Externalism. In M. Kusch (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Relativism. Routledge.
2018
No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’
McKenna, R. (n.d.). No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’. Logos & Episteme, 9(3), 335-342. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20189325
Introduction
Kyriacou, C., & McKenna, R. (2018). Introduction. In Metaepistemology (pp. 1-14). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_1
Metaepistemology
Kyriacou, C., & McKenna, R. (Eds.) (2018). Metaepistemology. Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6
The Genealogy of Relativism and Absolutism
Kusch, M., & McKenna, R. (2018). The Genealogy of Relativism and Absolutism. In METAEPISTEMOLOGY: REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM (pp. 217-239). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_10
2017
Metaepistemology and Relativism
McKenna, R. (2017). Metaepistemology and Relativism. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF SKEPTICISM, 7(3), 212-216. doi:10.1163/22105700-00001253
Action, Knowledge, and Will
McKenna, R. (2017). Action, Knowledge, and Will. ANALYSIS, 77(3), 667-670. doi:10.1093/analys/anx061
Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims
McKenna, R. (n.d.). Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims. The Philosophical Quarterly, pqw043. doi:10.1093/pq/pqw043
Conversational Kinematics
McKenna, R. (2017). Conversational Kinematics. In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism (pp. 321-331). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315745275-26
Pluralism About Knowledge
McKenna, R. (2017). Pluralism About Knowledge. In Epistemic Pluralism (pp. 171-199). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_7
2016
CLIFFORD AND THE COMMON EPISTEMIC NORM
McKenna, R. (2016). CLIFFORD AND THE COMMON EPISTEMIC NORM. AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 53(3), 245-257. Retrieved from https://www.webofscience.com/
2015
Revisionary Epistemology
Fassio, D., & McKenna, R. (2015). Revisionary Epistemology. INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 58(7-8), 755-779. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2015.1083468
Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity
McKenna, R. (2015). Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), 782-798. doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.1003075
Scepticism and Reliable Belief
McKenna, R. (2015). Scepticism and Reliable Belief. MIND, 124(496), 1402-1407. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv063
Contextualism in Epistemology
McKenna, R. (2015). Contextualism in Epistemology. ANALYSIS, 75(3), 489-503. doi:10.1093/analys/anv029
Knowledge Ascriptions
Mckenna, R. (2015). Knowledge Ascriptions. PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 65(259), 292-295. doi:10.1093/pq/pqu073
Epistemic contextualism defended
McKenna, R. (2015). Epistemic contextualism defended. SYNTHESE, 192(2), 363-383. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0572-5
2014
Shifting Targets and Disagreements
McKenna, R. (2014). Shifting Targets and Disagreements. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(04), 725-742. doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.891145
Normative scorekeeping
McKenna, R. (2014). Normative scorekeeping. SYNTHESE, 191(3), 607-625. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0293-1
Disagreeing about 'Ought'
McKenna, R. (2014). Disagreeing about 'Ought'. ETHICS, 124(3), 589-597. doi:10.1086/674842
2013
'KNOWLEDGE' ASCRIPTIONS, SOCIAL ROLES AND SEMANTICS
McKenna, R. (2013). 'KNOWLEDGE' ASCRIPTIONS, SOCIAL ROLES AND SEMANTICS. EPISTEME-A JOURNAL OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 10(4), 335-350. doi:10.1017/epi.2013.30
Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach
Mckenna, R. (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 94(1), 101-123. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01447.x
Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm
McKenna, R. (n.d.). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm. Logos & Episteme, 4(4), 457-464. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme2013446
2012
Assertion: New Philosophical Essays
Hazlett, A., McKenna, R., & Pollock, J. (2012). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. MIND, 121(483), 784-788. doi:10.1093/mind/fzs111
2011
Interests Contextualism
McKenna, R. (2011). Interests Contextualism. PHILOSOPHIA, 39(4), 741-750. doi:10.1007/s11406-011-9316-7
The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context
McKenna, R., & Pritchard, D. (2011). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 120(3), 455-460.