Publications
2023
Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities
Korpela, V., Lombardi, M., & Saulle, R. D. (2023). Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities. Games and Economic Behavior. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.008
An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
Jain, R., Lombardi, M., & Mueller, C. (2023). An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 142, 368-380. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.014
Behavioral strong implementation
Hayashi, T., Jain, R., Korpela, V., & Lombardi, M. (2023). Behavioral strong implementation. ECONOMIC THEORY. doi:10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0
Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
Lombardi, M., Savva, F., & Zivanas, N. (2023). Implementation in strong core by codes of rights. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 60(3), 503-515. doi:10.1007/s00355-022-01425-3
2022
Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information
Jain, R., & Lombardi, M. (2021). Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 102605. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605
2021
Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment
Hanaki, N., Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M., & Ogawa, K. (2021). Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 190, 366-389. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.038
Social discount rate: spaces for agreement
Hayashi, T., & Lombardi, M. (2021). Social discount rate: spaces for agreement. ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 9(2), 247-257. doi:10.1007/s40505-021-00209-9
Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
Korpela, V., Lombardi, M., & Vartiainen, H. (2021). Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 128, 202-212. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.007
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs
2020
On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents
Lombardi, M., & Tonin, S. (2020). On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents. ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 8(2), 203-218. doi:10.1007/s40505-019-00177-1
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
Lombardi, M., & Yoshihara, N. (2020). Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization. ECONOMIC THEORY, 70(3), 871-904. doi:10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Korpela, V., & Lombardi, M. (2020). Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 121, 108-116. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.006
Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
Korpela, V., Lombardi, M., & Vartiainen, H. (2020). Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 185. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2019.104953
2019
Constrained implementation
Hayashi, T., & Lombardi, M. (2019). Constrained implementation. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 183, 546-567. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.007
One-step-ahead implementation
Hayashi, T., & Lombardi, M. (2019). One-step-ahead implementation. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 83, 110-126. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.007
Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements
Hayashi, T., & Lombardi, M. (2019). Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements. ECONOMIC THEORY, 67(4), 775-816. doi:10.1007/s00199-017-1097-1
2018
Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
Lombardi, M., & Yoshihara, N. (2018). Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 111, 203-216. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004
2017
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
Lombardi, M., & Yoshihara, N. (2017). Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 46(4), 1015-1036. doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0568-8
Implementation in partial equilibrium
Hayashi, T., & Lombardi, M. (2017). Implementation in partial equilibrium. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 169, 13-34. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.008
2016
Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining
Driesen, B., Lombardi, M., & Peters, H. (2016). Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 67, 162-170. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003
LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE
Lombardi, M., Miyagishima, K., & Veneziani, R. (2016). LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 126(597), 2173-2196. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12298
2013
A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction
Lombardi, M., & Yoshihara, N. (2013). A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction. ECONOMIC THEORY, 54(1), 131-151. doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2
2012
Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
Lombardi, M. (2012). Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 16(4), 297-309. doi:10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7
Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
Lombardi, M., & Veneziani, R. (2012). Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12(1). doi:10.1515/1935-1704.1899
2010
Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims
Lombardi, M., & Yoshihara, N. (2010). Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 108(2), 229-232. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.004
What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority characterize?
Lombardi, M. (2010). What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority characterize?. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 59(3), 323-325. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.01.001
2009
Uncovered bargaining solutions
Lombardi, M., & Mariotti, M. (2009). Uncovered bargaining solutions. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 38(4), 601-610. doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0172-7
Minimal covering set solutions
Lombardi, M. (2009). Minimal covering set solutions. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 32(4), 687-695. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0361-5
Reason-based choice correspondences
Lombardi, M. (2009). Reason-based choice correspondences. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 57(1), 58-66. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.001
2008
Uncovered set choice rules
Lombardi, M. (2008). Uncovered set choice rules. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 31(2), 271-279. doi:10.1007/s00355-007-0281-9