A Rapprochement between the Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Relativism

Posted on: 10 December 2020 by Dr Azadeh Chalabi, Senior Lecturer at Liverpool Law School in Blog

On International Human Rights Day, let us remind ourselves that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. This fundamental statement implies the key principle of the universality of human rights. Despite the incredible importance of the universality of human rights, this principle has been criticised by cultural relativists who argue that human rights, as set forth in international human rights documents, emanate from Western cultural values and therefore are not universally valid. They hold that every culture includes different beliefs, values, norms and practices which are all valid and should be respected. They argue that those norms and practices considered wrong in some cultural contexts are justified in others.

Cultural relativism emerged historically in reaction to particularism (moral imperialism) and exacerbated later by postmodernism. The positive side of cultural relativism is that it denies moral absolutism which includes a claim of infallibility but the problem with relativism, in its strong form, is that it goes too far in the other direction, that is, it promotes radical pluralism accepting the juxtaposition of cultural differences in their own right without any attempt to reconcile them. Hence, it comes as no surprise that cultural practices such as female genital cutting (FGC), foot-binding, ‘Sati’ and even slavery in some forms can be accepted by those who implicitly or explicitly advocate relativism. Although they might be against these acts, the logical implication of strong relativism is that such acts are tenable if prescribed by culture and can be practiced by a minority group in their community or bigger society even if it is a clear instance of human rights violation such as FGC. Moreover, the reality is that those who are in power readily appeal to cultural relativism when a right clashes with their political or ideological interests. For example, this has been used by authoritarian governments to justify various forms of state violence, abuse against children and women under the name of cultural authenticity.

On the other hand, strong universalism (radical egalitarianism) places a veil over distinctions that do exist. Universalistic orientation in its strong form can lead to value absolutism which fails to account for variety in value systems around the world and for the changes in values over the course of time. By overlooking the dynamics and specificity of circumstances, absolutism can lead to an authoritarian set of ethics which clearly is not in harmony with the idea of realising human rights. Although the idea behind strong universalism is to erode discrimination of any kind, as its critics aptly argue, it ignores differences which can result in policies that are in fact biased and fail to treat different groups in a genuinely equal way.

How to reconcile the universality of human rights with cultural relativism? Since universalism and relativism are mutually contrary, not contradictory, a possible way forward is a combination of moderate relativism and moderate universalism. I will not try to treat this complex subject in its full form here, but instead concentrate my attention on just two significant points.

First, the idea of human rights is not Western or Eastern, but rather it is an evolutionary account. In this respect, some scholars have provided various instances showing that the idea of human rights has no boundaries in time or place. For example, William Talbott in his two-volume book on the universality of basic human rights, adopts the ‘Historical-Social Process of Moral Discovery’ to show overwhelming evidence of the fact that human rights do not belong to certain cultural tradition. As he argues, it is, for instance, a mistake to think that Western Europe has a tradition of religious tolerance. On the contrary, the first known advocates of religious tolerance were from the East—specifically, Ashoka (third century BC) from India, and Cyrus the Great (sixth century BC), king of Persia (Iran). Whereas in the United States slavery remained a legal institution until the late nineteenth century, as early as the sixth century BC Cyrus had not only strongly opposed slavery but also freed thousands of slaves. Martha Nussbaum likewise in ‘In Defense of Universal Values’ (p.214) mentions that ‘we need to remind ourselves that sex equality is an Indian constitutional idea and it is not an American constitutional idea’. In the East, on the other hand, very basic human rights are being violated every day. Infibulation is still approved by some cultures in Sudan, Egypt and Malaysia, for example. Whereas there is a core convention on the rights of people with disabilities, even today an idea common in India is that disability represents a personal flaw and a consequence of karmic retribution for misdeeds (see Nayreen Daruwalla and others).

Second, as I discussed in the “NIC theory of human rights” as an integrated approach, basic human rights are grounded in universal objective values which are rooted in basic human needs. In my last book, National Human Rights Action Planning, I made a distinction between “human needs” and “human interests”. Ontologically speaking, human beings have the same basic needs which exist in the external world independently of the knowing subject. Epistemologically, our knowledge of human needs and their corresponding rights has improved over time. The critical point is that universality in this form does not refute differences but instead encourages unity through diversity. There is often a broad range of items (objects or processes) to fulfil basic needs. This is where individual differences and cultural differences in the form of “human interests” come in. Human interests for the fulfilment of basic needs are dependent on socio-cultural context but it makes no difference to the universality of basic human rights.

A combination of moderate relativism and moderate universalism presents unity through diversity which encompasses not only a set of universal objective values such as health, peace and friendship rooted in basic human needs but also individual and cultural differences which are bound to place, time, and circumstances. That is, cultural differences are accepted in so far as they do not contradict with objective universal values. This rapprochement can help replace destructive conflicts with constructive competitions and cooperation.

Dr Azadeh Chalabi is a Senior Lecturer in the Liverpool Law School  Dr Chalabi is an expert on international human rights law, legal theory and sociology of law. Her most recent book ‘National Human Rights Action Planning’ (OUP, 2018) explores human rights planning from theoretical, doctrinal, empirical and practical perspectives. It is the first ever volume dedicated to this area and provides the most comprehensive study of human rights planning to date. Dr Chalabi is also a member of the International Law and Human Rights Unit  at the School of Law and Social Justice. 

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