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Social Epistemology

In this session of the “Children in Theory” series, Professor Alison MacKenzie (Queen’s University Belfast) introduces the main tenets of Social Epistemology as a theoretical method. She later discusses with Amy Hanna (Queen’s University Belfast) the applicability of the framework to the study of childhood.

What is Social Epistemology?

MacKenzie, A. (2022). What is Social Epistemology? In N. Brando, D. Lawson and H. Stalford (eds.) Children in Theory: Theoretical Methods and Approaches to the Study of Childhood.  Online Masterclass Series. University of Liverpool.

In this session, Alison MacKenzie introduces social epistemology as a theoretical method, and focuses on exploring the value and applicability of one particular dimension of social epistemology of utmost relevance for socially-engaged research: Epistemic Injustice. Simply explained, epistemic injustice is fundamentally concerned with a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower.

This classic formulation comes from one of the seminal thinkers in social epistemology, Miranda Fricker. Her ground-breaking work, Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing (2007) has revivified epistemology which, in its traditional forms, ignored the relational aspect of knowledge, including its ethical and political dimensions. Epistemic injustice offers rich ethical and epistemological insights into why injustice persists, despite our best attempts at meliorating their effects through education, health, law, and human rights. Key issues and authors addressed:

  • Miranda Fricker and the concepts of epistemic, testimonial and hermeneutical injustices.
  • José Medina and forms of epistemic resistance.
  • Kristie Dotson, epistemic oppression and contributory injustice.
  • Epistemologies of ignorance.
  • Children and epistemic injustice.
  • Common mistakes in the application of epistemic injustice.

Social Epistemology and Childhood Studies

Hanna, A. and MacKenzie, A. (2022). Social Epistemology and Childhood Studies. In N. Brando, D. Lawson and H. Stalford (eds.) Children in Theory: Theoretical Methods and Approaches to the Study of Childhood.  Online Masterclass Series. University of Liverpool.

Springing from the introduction to social epistemology as a theoretical framework, Alison MacKenzie and Amy Hanna discuss its applicability to studies on childhood, some current trends in research on childhood and social epistemology, and methods to make use of the conceptual tools of social epistemology to carry out empirical research with children. Among the issues addressed are the following questions:

  • Hermeneutical injustices are still very abstract in childhood studies. What are examples of hermeneutical injustices faced by children and young people in our society? 
  • Testimony centres around 'speech acts'; what role or function, if any, is there for silence within the Epistemic Injustice framework? Can silence be testimony?
  • Epistemic Injustice has a crucial contribution in explaining why children's rights and the right to be heard struggle to be taken up by adults. Where might social epistemology (in regard to children specifically) go from this point?
  • What advice can be given to a researcher who is embarking upon empirical research that employs Epistemic Injustice? What are the best methodologies for applying epistemic injustice to empirical research?

Further References and Sources

For a good introductory overview of concepts, methodologies, frameworks and applied case studies in epistemic injustice:

  • Kidd, I.J, Medina, M. and Polhaus, G. (eds.) (2017).  ‪The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice‪. London: Routledge.
  • Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Medina, J. (2012). The Epistemology of Ignorance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Key Texts:

Children and epistemic injustice:

  • Burroughs, M.D. and Tollefson, D. (2016). Learning to listen: Epistemic injustice and the child. Episteme13(3): 359-377.
  • Carel, H. and Györffy, G. (2014). Seen but not heard: Children and epistemic injustice. TheLancet 384 (9950): 1256-1257.
  • Murris, K. (2013). The epistemic challenge of hearing child’s voice [Special issue]. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 32(3):245–259.

Black and coloured feminist epistemology:

  • Alcoff, L.M. (1996). ‘The problem of speaking for others. Who can speak?’ Authority and Critical Identity. Judith Roof and Robyn Wiegman (Eds). Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
  • Alcoff, L.M. (2010). Epistemic identities. Episteme, 7(2): 128–137.
  • Collins, P. H. (2000). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowermen New York: Routledge.
  • Davis, A. (1981).  Women, Race and Class. New York: Random House.
  • Hooks, B. (1992). Black Looks: Race and Representation. Brooklyn, NY: South End Press.
  • Lorde, A. (1984). Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Trumansburg, NY: Crossing Press.
  • Spivak, G. C. (2003). Can the subaltern speak? Die Philosophin, 14 (27): 42–58.

Disability:

  • Barnes, E. (2017). The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6, 'Disability Pride' for hermeneutical injustice.
  • MacKenzie, A. (2018). Prejudicial stereotypes and testimonial injustice: Autism, sexuality and sex education. International Journal of Educational Research. 89(1): 110-118.

Healthcare:

  • Carel, H., Györffy, G. and Kidd, I.J. (2014). Epistemic injustice in healthcare: A philosophical analysis. Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy17(4): 529-40.
  • Freeman, L. and Stewart, H. (2021). The problem of recognition, erasure, and epistemic injustice in medicine: Harms to transgender and gender non-binary patients - why we should be worried. In Paul Giladi & Nicola McMillan (eds.),Recognition Theory and Epistemic Injustice. London: Routledge.
  • Dotson, K. (2012). A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, 33(1): 24-47.

Ignorance:

  • Pohlhaus, G. Jr. (2012). Relational knowing and epistemic injustice: Toward a theory of willful hermeneutical ignorance. Hypatia 27 (4): 715–735.
  • Mills, C. (2007). ‘White ignorance.’ Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds). Albany, NY: SUNY Press, (11–38).
  • Sullivan, S. and Tuana, N. (eds) (2007). Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Rape:

  • Jenkins, K. (2017). Rape myths and domestic abuse myths as hermeneutical injustices. Journal of Applied Philosophy 34(2): 191-205.
  • MacKenzie, A. forthcoming. Why didn’t you scream? Epistemic injustices of sexism, misogyny and rape myths.

Silence:

  • Hanna, A.(2021). Seen and Not Heard: Students' uses and experiences of silence in school relationships at a secondary school. Childhood. DOI: 1177/09075682211055605
  • Hanna, A.(2021). Silence at school: Uses and experiences of silence in pedagogy at a secondary school. British Educational Research Journal. DOI: 10.1002/berj.3719

This project has been developed by members of the European Children’s Rights Unit with the support of the British Academy’s Newton International Fellowship award No. NIFBA19\190492KU. For more information on the series, please contact Nico Brando.

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