2024
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2024). Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond. In SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics Vol. 38 (pp. 1007-1029). Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM). doi:10.1137/23m1545677DOI: 10.1137/23m1545677
2023
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Fusco, F., Lazos, P., Leonardi, S., & Reiffenhäuser, R. (n.d.). Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness. Mathematics of Operations Research. doi:10.1287/moor.2022.0058DOI: 10.1287/moor.2022.0058
Fair division of indivisible goods: Recent progress and open questions (Journal article)
Amanatidis, G., Aziz, H., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Li, B., Moulin, H., . . . Wu, X. (2023). Fair division of indivisible goods: Recent progress and open questions. Artificial Intelligence, 322, 103965. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2023.103965DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2023.103965
Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Lazos, P., Leonardi, S., & Reiffenhäuser, R. (2023). Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM. doi:10.1145/3580507.3597796DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597796
2022
Parallel Contests for Crowdsourcing Reviews: Existence and Quality of Equilibria (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Kovalchuk, L., Lazos, P., & Oliynykov, R. (2022). Parallel Contests for Crowdsourcing Reviews: Existence and Quality of Equilibria. In PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2022 4TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES, AFT 2022 (pp. 268-280). doi:10.1145/3558535.3559776DOI: 10.1145/3558535.3559776
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains (Journal article)
Birmpas, G., Markakis, E., & Schaefer, G. (2022). Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, 10(1). doi:10.1145/3505586DOI: 10.1145/3505586
A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching (Journal article)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2022). A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching. JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH, 74, 227-261. Retrieved from https://www.webofscience.com/
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Fusco, F., Lazos, P., Leonardi, S., & Reiffenhäuser, R. (2022). Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness. In Unknown Conference (pp. 149-166). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9
Decentralized Update Selection with Semi-strategic Experts (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Lazos, P., & Marmolejo-Cossío, F. (2022). Decentralized Update Selection with Semi-strategic Experts. In Unknown Conference (pp. 403-420). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_23DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_23
Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2022). Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey. In Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization. doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/756DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/756
Fair Equilibria in Sponsored Search Auctions: The Advertisers’ Perspective (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Celli, A., Colini-Baldeschi, R., & Leonardi, S. (2022). Fair Equilibria in Sponsored Search Auctions: The Advertisers’ Perspective. In Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization. doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/14DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/14
2021
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2021). Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries.. Artif. Intell., 296, 103488.
Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries. (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2021). Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries.. In Artif. Intell. Vol. 296 (pp. 103488).
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Hollender, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2021). Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX. Theoretical Computer Science, 863, 69-85. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2021.02.020DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2021.02.020
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2021). A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching. In THIRTY-FIFTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Vol. 35 (pp. 5078-5085). Retrieved from https://www.webofscience.com/
A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching. (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2021). A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching.. In AAAI (pp. 5078-5085). AAAI Press. Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/issue/view/385
Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games (Journal article)
Birmpas, G., Gan, J., Hollender, A., Marmolejo-Cossío, F. J., Rajgopal, N., & Voudouris, A. A. (n.d.). Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 72, 507-531. doi:10.1613/jair.1.12542DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.12542
2020
A simple deterministic algorithm for symmetric submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint (Journal article)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., & Markakis, E. (2020). A simple deterministic algorithm for symmetric submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint. Information Processing Letters, 163, 106010. doi:10.1016/j.ipl.2020.106010DOI: 10.1016/j.ipl.2020.106010
Fairness and Efficiency in DAG-Based Cryptocurrencies (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Koutsoupias, E., Lazos, P., & Marmolejo-Cossío, F. J. (2020). Fairness and Efficiency in DAG-Based Cryptocurrencies. In Unknown Conference (pp. 79-96). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_6DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_6
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Hollender, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2020). Maximum Nash Welfare and Other Stories About EFX. In PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (pp. 24-30). Retrieved from https://www.webofscience.com/
Maximum Nash Welfare and Other Stories About EFX. (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Hollender, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2020). Maximum Nash Welfare and Other Stories About EFX.. In C. Bessiere (Ed.), IJCAI (pp. 24-30). ijcai.org. Retrieved from https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/2020/
Optimally deceiving a learning leader in stackelberg games (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Gan, J., Hollender, A., Marmolejo-Cossío, F. J., Rajgopal, N., & Voudouris, A. A. (2020). Optimally deceiving a learning leader in stackelberg games. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems Vol. 2020-December.
Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., & Voudouris, A. A. (2020). Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries. In THIRTY-FOURTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THE THIRTY-SECOND INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND THE TENTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Vol. 34 (pp. 1782-1789). Retrieved from https://www.webofscience.com/
2019
Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction (Journal article)
Birmpas, G., Markakis, E., Telelis, O., & Tsikiridis, A. (2019). Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction. Theory of Computing Systems, 63(7), 1451-1469. doi:10.1007/s00224-018-9889-7DOI: 10.1007/s00224-018-9889-7
Cost sharing over combinatorial domains: Complement-free cost functions and beyond (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Markakis, E., & Schäfer, G. (2019). Cost sharing over combinatorial domains: Complement-free cost functions and beyond. In Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs Vol. 144. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.20DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.20
2018
Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., & Markakis, V. (2018). Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization. doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/6DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2018/6
2017
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Christodoulou, G., & Markakis, E. (2017). Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness. In EC'17: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION (pp. 545-562). doi:10.1145/3033274.3085147DOI: 10.1145/3033274.3085147
On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., & Markakis, E. (2017). On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives. In Unknown Conference (pp. 1-15). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1
Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Markakis, E., Telelis, O., & Tsikiridis, A. (2017). Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction. In Unknown Conference (pp. 16-28). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_2DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_2
2016
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., & Markakis, E. (2016). Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design. In Unknown Conference (pp. 414-428). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_29DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_29
On truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations (Conference Paper)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., & Markakis, E. (2016). On truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations. In IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence Vol. 2016-January (pp. 31-37).
2015
Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing (Conference Paper)
Birmpas, G., Courcoubetis, C., Giotis, I., & Markakis, E. (2015). Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing. In Unknown Conference (pp. 43-56). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_4DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_4
